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SOME RECENT IMPORTANT TRENDS IN CANADIAN PRIVATE 
JNTERNATIONAL LAW 
by J.-G. Castel, Q.C. * 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1967, on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the Confederation, the 
author of~ paper suggested that it was about time for Canada to join the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law. Such a move would show to everyone 
that Canada's legal horizons and objectives had become world wide.1 The 
government of the day followed this suggestion and, in 1968, Canada joined the 
Conference. Since that time, Canada has participated ~cti~ely in its work as well 
as that of other international organizations devoted to the unification of law 
especially in the area of commercial law.2 It is, therefore, appropriate to examine 
recent trends in the field of private international law in Canada on the occasion of 
the hundredth anniversary of the Hague Conference and to ascertain the extent to 
which Canadian rules have been influenced by its conventions. 
Due to the limited space available, this paper will examine only the most 
important aspects· of these new trends, namely the adoption of conventions and 
model laws prepared by the Hague Conference, and other international bodies and 
the jurisprudential move towards the principle of proximity. Mention will also be 
made of the private international rules in the new Civil Code of Quebec. 
2. CONVENTIONS AND MODEL LAWS 
Before ascertaining the direct influence of the Hague Conference or other 
international organizations on the development of private international law rules 
* Distinguished Research Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, where 
he teaches private international law and international business law and economic relations. 
1. J.-G Castel, 'Canada and the Hague Conference on Private International Law: 1983-1967', 47 
Can. Bar Rev. (1967) p. 1. 
2. In 1968. Canada joined the Intemational Institute for the Unification of Private Law. It has also 
participated in the work of the United Nations Commission on International Trade and of the 
International Civil Aviation Org~tion. 
Netherlands International Law Review, XL: 15-30, 1993 
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in Canada, it should be mentioned that Canada is a federal State whose 1 
constitution3 divides the legislative power between the federal parliament and the 
provincial legislatures. Some private international law rules fall wholly or Partly . 
within the legislative competence of the provinces, while others come within the j 
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal parliament. Implementation of treaties must be l 
done by the competent legislative body. With respect to the negotj.ation and 
conclusion of treaties, the Federal Government has taken the position that it 
represents all of Canada. However, it will co-operate with the provinces in fields 
within their legislative competence. Thus, although Canada is a member of the 
Hague Conference, its delegation often comprises persons appointed in consul-
tation with the provinces. l 
To avoid the constitutional and international difficulties that might arise if 
provincial legislation required for the fulfilment of an international obligation were 
not passed, prior consultations usually take place and agreement is reached with the 
provinces before Canada signs and ratifies a treaty. Actually, unless it contains a 
federal State clause Canada will not sign a treaty until it has received the 
unanimous support of all the provinces. These difficulties are minimized when the 
treaty merely contains a model law to be recommended for adoption by the 
provinces. 
2.1 Hague Conventions 
Canada has not been too keen to accede to international conventions adopted 
before it joined the Conference that did not contain a federal State clause . . 
However, on September 26, 1988, Canada acceded to the Convention on the 
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial 
Matters concluded on November 15, 1965. This was done after all provincial and 
federal rules of court had been amended accordingly.4 A declaration was made 
against certain fonns of service, and regarding translation requirements and delays. 
The October 5th, 1961 Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation 
for Foreign Public Documents is still being considered. Canada will accede to it if 
it receives positive replies from all the provinces. 
The Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial 
Matters, concluded on March 18, 1970, after Canada joined the Conference, has 
also been submitted to the provinces for comments before Canada decides whether 
or not to accede to it. It contains reservations with respect to language 
requirements, delays and pre-trial discovery. 
Of the post-1968 conventions with a federal State clause, the most successful 
one is the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
3. Constitution Act (1867), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, as amended, especially ss. 91-92. 
4. The Convention came into force for Canada on May 1, 1989. 
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concluded on October 25; 1980, which allows for a reservation on legal aid. It 
came into force throughout Canada on 1 April 1988, having been implemented at 
all levels of government with or without the reservation. 
The 1985 Convention on the Law Applicable to ·Trusts and their Recognition 
contains a declaration to include trusts created judicially and reservations to allow 
JIJ.andatory rules, to exclude trusts governed by the law of a non-contracting State, 
and to exclude retroactive effect It was signed by Canada on October 11, 1988, 
and has been implemented by a number of provinces with the declaration and with 
or without the reservation on retroactive effect Consultations with the provinces 
are now taking place with respect to the implementation of the 1988 Convention 
on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons before 
accession by Canada. 
It should be mentioned that in the field of torts, the Y ukon5 has adopted the 
uniform Conflict of Laws (Traffic Accidents) Act6 which is based on the Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents concluded on May 4, 
1971. 
2.2 International Civil Aviation Organization 
Although Canada has not yet acceded to the 1948 Convention on the Recognition 
of Rights in Aircraft, implementing legislation has been passed in two provinces. 
Other provinces have also indicated their support for the Convention. 
2.3 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law7 
The 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards as well as the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
are in force throughout Canada as they have been implemented by legislation at all 
levels of government.8 On April 23, 1991, Canada acceded to the 1988 Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, which contains a federal State 
clause and allows for some reservations. It has been implemented by federal and 
provincial legislation. 
This very brief survey indicates that, in recent years, Canada has taken a greater 
interest in international conventions dealing with topics of a social or economic 
5. S.Y.T .. 1972 (1st sess.), c. 3. 
6. 1970 Proceedings of the Uniform Law Conference p. 263. 
7. Excluded from the scope of this paper because it does not deal with private international law, is 
the 1973 Convention prepared by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will which is now in force in most of 
Canada. 
8. See J.-G. Castel et al., The Canadian I.Aw and Practice of International Trade (1991) ch. 18, at 
p.483. 
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nature. In fact, it was one of the first States to implement the Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration. At present, Canada is very interested in the 
elaboration of a Hague Convention on inter-country adoption9 and a Unidroit 
Convention on security interests in mobile equipment, as the choice of law rules 
in force in Western Europe and North America are inadequate to meet the needs 
of those who engage in modem financing transactions involving collateral in the 
form of mobile equipment such as trucks and construction equipment. 
3. THE PRINCIPLE OF PROXIMITY 
In recent years, in cases involving one of more legally relevant foreign elements, . 
Canadian courts have become very interested in applying the principle of proximity 
1 
as a general rule or as an exception to determine the applicable law or the 1 
jurisdiction of domestic and foreign courts. 1 
In theory, the principle of proximity means that the courts will apply to a l 
particular legal relationship the local law of the State or province with which it has l 
the most real and substantial connection, that an action must be brought before the ' 
court of the State or province with which it has the most real and substantial j 
connection and, that a foreign judgment will be recognized and enforced only if the 1 
original court had a most real and substantial connection with the action. The 1 
principle of proximity seeks to achieve more effectively some of the basic ' 
objectives of private international law, particularly justice of the end result.10 
3.1 Contracts 
Historically, it is in the field of contracts that the principle of proximity was first 
adopted as a general rule. Thus, it is now well established in Canada that where the 
parties have not expressly selected the law applicable to their contract and no such 
selection can be inferred, the proper law is the system of law with which the 
contractual transaction has the most real and substantial connection.11 This 
principle has also been applied to marriage contracts or settlements12 and to the 
9. A Canadian was elected chairperson of the special commission in charge of drafting this 
convention. 
10. In general see H. Yntema, 'The Objectives of Private International Law', 35 Can. Bar Rev. 
(1957) p. 721. Also the Restatement of the Law Second, Conflict of Laws 2d (1971) s. 6. 
11. See, for example, Imperial Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Colmenares [1967] S.C.R. 443; 
the whole category of contract and not just one particular legal issue is governed by the law most 
substantially connected, although depefage is always possible. J.-G. Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws, 
2nd edn. (1986) s. 406, at p. 535. 
12. See Devos v. Devos [1970] 2 O.R. 323 (CA) ands. 58 of the Family Law Act 1986, S.O. 1986, 
c.4. 
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validity of trusts inter vivos of interests in movables. 13 It means that there will be 
no automatic change in the law applicable to the marriage contract or settlement 
once the spouses have moved their matrimonial home to another country even if 
that country now has a more real and substantial connection With their financial 
interests, because the real and substantial connection must exist at the time when 
the marriage contract or settlement was entered into by the spouses. 
As a general rule, the principle of proximity may be potentially dangerous since, 
in the absence of settled connecting factors, it cannot always achieve certainty and 
predictability which are important objectives in the field of contracts. However, it 
has the advantage of eliminating the need for characterization in borderline cases 
where the choice is between contracts and torts. It is also more likely to achieve 
justice in the individual case. Finally, it excludes the theory of renvoi.14 
Fortunately, Canadian courts have clearly indicated which connecting factors they 
will consider as most relevant when determining the law that has the most real or 
substantial connection with a particular type of transaction or issue. When two or 
more of these factors point to a particular place, it is almost impossible to apply the 
law of another place. Thus, it is still possible to achieve predictability and to 
protect the justified expectations of the contracting parties. Actually, all they have 
to do to avoid any uncertainly is to select expressly the applicable law. It should 
be pointed out that Canadian courts do not first choose the 'better law' and then 
justify their choice by selecting the connecting factors that lead to its application. 
3.2 Torts 
It is in the field of torts that Canadian courts appear to be moving toward the 
adoption -of the principle of proximity as an exception. If the application of the 
general choice of law rule results in the designation of a law that has no or little 
significant connection with the occurrence and the parties, the courts, in order to 
achieve justice in the particular case, will apply the principle of proximity as an 
exception to the general rule. Here, the principle of proximity performs a corrective 
function. A good example would be to apply the law of the residence of the victim 
instead of the law of the place of the accident where such place is purely fortuitous. 
In Canada, the general common law private international law rule applicable to 
foreign torts was adopted in England more than a century ago: 15 
'As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England for a wrong alleged to have been 
committed abroad, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the wrong must be of such a 
13. J.-G.-Castel, Canadian Conflict of IAws, 2nd edn. (1986) s. 362, at p. 481. See also Art. 7 of 
the 1988 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts that has been implemented in several 
provinces. 
14. J.-G. Castel, Canadian Conflict of IAws, 2nd edn. (1986) s. 413, at p. 545. 
15. Phillips v. Eyre (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 1, at pp. 28-29. 
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character that it would have been actionable if conunitted in England ... Secondly, the 
act must not have been justifiable by the law of the place where it was done.' 
In the common law world, much difference of opinion has arisen with respect to 
the interpretation and application of this general rule. There is a substantial body 
of judicial opinion which holds that both conditions determine the jurisdiction of 
the courts over the cause of action, i.e., foreign torts. Once they have been met, the 
lex Jori applies to questions of substance and procedure. The primacy given to the 
lex Jori would encourage forum shopping although it could be controlled by the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens. Questions of substance should not be 
determined by the lex f ori in its domestic sense, especially when that law has no 
connection with the forum. To interpret the general rule as jurisdictional in nature 
would often lead to unjust results. This is why, in Canada, the courts consider it to 
be a true double-barrelled choice of law rule. 16 
The first condition of the rule that a wrong must be of such a character that it 
would have been actionable if committed in England has not given rise to much 
controversy. The claim must have arisen in circumstances that if they had occurred 
in the forum, a cause of action would have arisen entitling the plaintiff to enforce 
against the defendant a civil liability of the kind which the plaintiff claims to 
enforce. In other words, civil liability must exist under the lex Jori. 
It is with respect to the meaning of the second condition of the rule, i.e., the act 
must not have been justifiable by the law of the place where it was done, that much 
confusion still exists today due to many divergent interpretations. The issue is 
whether something other than civil liability is sufficient to render an act not 
justifiable. 
In Canada, the Supreme Court in McLean v. Pettigrew, 17 adopted the 
interpretation given to that condition by the English Court of Appeal in Machado 
v. F ontes18 that not justifiable means not legally innocent. Thus, criminal liability 
is sufficient to render an act not justifiable even though it does not give rise to any 
civil actionability or liability. Machado v. Fontes has been much criticized and was 
overruled by a majority of the House of Lords in Chaplin v. Boys19 which held 
that the act is not justifiable only if it is civilly actionable under the lex loci delicti. 
The concept of civil actionability is also subject to several interpretations. It could 
mean (a) actionability by the lex loci delicti whether or not damages can be 
16. 1.-G. Castel, Canadian Conflict of l.Aws, 2nd edn. (1986) s. 469 at p. 605, and generally see P. 
Bates, 'Foreign Torts: The Canadian Choice of Law Rule', 8 Advocate Q. (1987) p. 397. 
17. [1945] S.C.R. 62. 
18. [1897] 2 Q.B. 231 (CA). Some members of the court considered that theactcomplainedofmust 
not be 'innocent' in the country where it was done and that if the act was contrary in any respect to the 
law of that country, though giving rise to no civil liability there, it was not 'justifiable' for the purpose 
of the second condition. 
19. (1971] A.C. 356. 
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recovered, for instance where the act creates a cause of action but there exists a 
complete defence which precludes civil liability from arising, or (b) some civil 
liability under the lex loci delicti even though some of the damages claimed by the 
plaintiff cannot be recovered under that law,20 or (c) civil liability in accordance 
with the lex loci delicti including the extent of such liability. Here, the provisions 
of the lex loci delicti denying, limiting or qualifying the recovery of damages must 
be taken into consideration before determining whether the act is not justifiable by 
that law. The question is not whether the act was innocent but whether civ.il 
liability existed in respect of the relevant claim as between the actual parties under 
the lex loci delicti of the ldnd sought to be imposed under that law.21 .This 
interpretation is consistent with the vested rights theory adopted in Phillips v. 
Eyre.22 It also achieves the objective of certainty and, in the case of 
interprovincial torts, gives recognition to the laws in force at the place of tort. An 
individual should not be able to claim in the forum in respect of a .matter for which 
civil liability does not exist or is excluded under the law of the place where the 
wrong was committed. 
In Chaplin v. Boys, the House of Lords did not replace the rule in Phillips v. 
Eyre by the principle of proximity.23 However, Lords Hodson and Wilberforce 
introduced this principle as an exception in the name of flexibility in order to 
achieve individual justice in cases where with respect to a particular issue, the 
place of the tort has little interest in seeing its law applied due to a lack of other 
proper connections. 24 This exception finds its justification in the language used 
by Willes J. in Phillips v. Eyre when he said '[a]s a general rule'.25 The exception 
to the general rule should discourage forum shopping. It does not confer an 
unfettered judicial discretion away from the lex loci delicti or the lex f ori, enabling 
the general rule to be ignored in arbitrary fashion, as there must be a sufficient 
justification to apply it. 
In Canada, the courts are still trying to find ways to escape the clutches of 
Machado v. Fontes. Thus, in Grimes v. Cloutier and Cloutier,26 the respondent, 
a resident of Ontario, while riding as a passenger in an automobile registered and 
insured in Ontario and driven by an Ontario resident, sustained personal injuries 
as a result of a collision in Quebec with an automobile registered and insured in 
20. This was the situation in Chaplin v. Boys, supra n. 19. 
21. Lord Wilberforce in Chaplin v. Chaplin, supra n. 19, at p. 389. It is the relevant claim as 
between the. actual parties which must be looked at, and not whether such a claim would in theory be 
actionable. Per Dunn L.J. inArmagas Ltd. v. Mundogas S.A. [1986] 1 A.C. 717, at p. 753 (CA); also 
GoffL.J. atp. 740; andBreavington v. Godleman (1988) 62 A.L.J.R. 447 (Australia HC). 
22. (1870) L.R. 6 Q .B. 1, at p . 28. 
23. Also called the proper law of tort. See Restatement of the Law Second, Conflict of Laws 2d 
(1971) SS. 145-146. 
24. [1971] A.C. 356, at pp. 377-378, 380, 391-392. 
25. (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 1. 
26. (1989) 69 O.R. (2d) 641 (CA). 
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that province driven by the first appellant and owned by the second appellant, both 
residents of Quebec. The first appellant had been found guilty of driving in breach 
of the Quebec Highway Code27 at the time of the collision. The respondent had 
received benefits in full satisfaction of all amounts payable to her in accordance 
with the provisions of the Quebec Automobile Insurance Act,28 which as a result 
of an agreement between Quebec and Ontario were part of the Ontario standard 
automobile policy. In addition, she brought an action for full common law damages 
in Ontario against the two Quebec residents in order to obtain more than that which 
was provided by the Quebec insurance scheme which barred a civil action. The 
trial judge found for the respondent as he refused to distinguish the facts of this 
case from those of McLean v Pettigrew.29 On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
preferred to distinguish McLean v. Pettigrew on the facts, than to re-interpret the 
second rule in Phillips v. Eyre on the ground that: 
' Whatever weakness there may be in the interpretative reasoning in Machado v. Fontes, 
a countervailing consideration should also be noted: as a matter of policy an inflexible 
rule that the absence of civil liability in the place where the alleged tort took place is a 
valid defence can, in some cases lead to an unjust result. '30 
In the arduous task of distinguishing McLean v. Pettigrew from the facts of the 
case under appeal, the court resorted to a variety of arguments, some of which are 
of dubious value. First, a review of a number of Canadian decisions which applied 
McLean v. Pettigrew enabled the Court of Appeal to conclude that this case did not 
preclude the application of the law of Quebec. Although the court admitted that in 
the past the residence of the parties may not have been a decisive factor in 
interpreting the second rule in Phillips v. Eyre, it attached great importance to the 
fact that in the case under review the two appellants were resident in the place 
where the accident occured whereas this was not so in McLean v. Pettigrew. Yet, 
it should be noted that in the latter case, the residence of all the parties in the place 
where the action was brought may have been the decisive factor in allowing 
recovery by the gratuitous passenger. The Court of Appeal also relied upon the 
qualifying clause '[a]s a general rule' used by Willes J. in Phillips v. Eyre in his 
27. R.L.Q. 1977. c. C-24, s. 83. 
28. L.Q. 1977, c. 68, especially ss. 4 and 8. 
29. In McLean v. Pettigrew [1945] S.C.R. 62, the accident occurred in Ontario. The plaintiff was 
· a gratuitous passenger in the automobile driven and owned by the defendant. Both parties resided in 
Quebec and the automobile was registered and insured in that province. If the accident had taken place 
in Quebec, the defendant would have been civilly liable for the plaintiff's d3magcs whereas in Ontario 
at that time it was difficult to hold drivers and owners civilly liable to gratuitous passengers. As the 
Supreme Court found the defendant to have driven in a careless manner in breach of the Ontario 
Highway Traffic Act, the wrong was not justifiable under the lex loci delicti and the gratuitous 
passenger was able to recover her damages. 
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statement of the rule to point out that it admits exceptions. Since in McLean v. 
Pettigrew, the court also used the prefatory words '[u]nder these conditions' ,31 
there were good reasons for the Court of Appeal in the light of these other factors 
not to apply the second rule in Phi/lips v. Eyre in all cases .inv0lving foreign torts, 
especially if it would lead to an unjust result as in the case under appeal. Jn McLean 
v. Pettigrew, the result on the facts was a just one which could also have been 
reached by applying the principle of proximity. Jn the present case, the accident 
took place in Quebec where it was covered by the Quebec automobile 
compensation scheme. The appellants, as residents of that province, were legally 
entitled to the protection of that scheme. It would have been unjust to submit them 
to the law of Ontario and destroy their reasonable expectations of the legal 
consequences of their conduct. As for the respondent victim, the court stated that 
it would be difficult to believe that she would have had any reasonable expectation 
that Ontario law would apply to the exclusion of Quebec law with respect to any 
driving accident occurring in Quebec. Tiris view, however, emphasizes the place 
of the accident rather than the residence of the tortfeasor. Finally, the Court of 
Appeal added that comity as between the provinces required one province when 
applying its laws not to ignore the policies of another province as expressed in its 
legislation. Thus, the court concluded that, on the facts of the case, it should not 
apply the 'punishable' gloss of the second rule in Phillips v. Eyre. Since the 
appellants were not civilly liable to the respondent for the accident in Quebec, her 
claim failed. 
Today, at least in Ontario, until the Supreme Court of Canada reconsiders the 
general rule, where the defendant resides in the place of the tort, not 'justifiable', 
in Phillips v. Eyre, means the existence of civil liability only, in respect of the 
relevant claim as between the actual parties, of the kind sought to be imposed under 
that law. However, Machado v. Fontes continues to apply to some situations in 
order to achieve individual justice. 
The decision of the Court of Appeal is a disguised attempt to adopt the principle 
of proximity as an exception since the application of the test in McLean v. 
Pettigrew or the one in Grimes v. Cloutier and Cloutier depends upon the existence 
of certain connecting factors that indicate which jurisdiction has the most real and 
substantial connection with the occurrence and the parties with respect to a 
particular issue. 32 Probably, the court took this approach because it favoured 
reforming the law by legislative rather than by judicial intervention.33 
31. [1945) S.C.R 62, at p. 76. 
32. See also Gagnon v. Gagnon (1991) 3 O.R. (3d) 38. 
33. Many other Canadian courts have expressed the view that, were it not far the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in McLean v. Pettigrew, they would have adopted the principle of proximity 
either as a general principle or as an exception. Note that in England, Dicey and Morris, The Conflict 
of Laws, 1 lth edn. (1987), adopt the principle of proximity as an exception: role 205(2) at pp. 1365-
1366, whereas the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law, Second, Conflict of Laws 2d 
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In the field of foreign torts, the principle of proximity should be invoked only 
in special circumst.ances where, after an examination of the policy underlying the 
laws which may be applied under Phillips v. Eyre and the interests of the parties 
to be affected, it is clear that the lex loci delicti has no real and substantial 
connection with the proceedings. 
The use of the principle of proximity as an exception in order to correct an 
anomalous situation is justifiable where certainty, predictability and uniformity of 
results are not important considerations. 
3.3 Jurisdiction of courts 
The principle of proximity which has been applied by Canadian courts as a general 
rule or as an exception in choice of law cases has not played a comparable role in 
the area of conflicts of jurisdictions. This is surprising as it would seem logical and 
just for the court applying the law most really and substantially connected to be 
also the one that is most really and substantially connected with the lawsuit. 
However, indirectly, the principle of proximity has worked its way into conflicts 
of jurisdictions through the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
In Canada, at common law, the primary rule to determine whether a court has 
jurisdiction in personam to hear and determine an issue upon which its decision is 
sought, is that so long as the defendant is personally served with a writ or 
originating process in the court's territory, that court can hear the matter. The 
presence of the defendant is paramount. However, since in disputes involving one 
or more legally relevant foreign elements, it is possible for a defendant to avoid 
service of the writ or originating process by leaving the province or Canada, or by 
remaining abroad, provincial and federal rules of procedure list the specific 
circumst.ances where a person may be served outside the court's territory, for 
instance if relief is sought against a defendant domiciled or ordinarily resident or 
carrying on business in the jurisdiction. 34 The rules governing service outside the 
court's territory determine when the court has jurisdiction over a defendant outside 
the province or Canada. Once served, within or without the province or Canada, the 
defendant may move for an order to set aside the service or to stay the proceeding, 
on the ground that the court is forum non conveniens for the hearing of the 
proceeding. It is at this stage of the proceeding that the principle of proximity 
comes into the picture in order to set aside the relevant jurisdictional rule when 
~arranted by the circumstances. Thus, in Canada the most real and substantial 
connection is not a general principle for the exercise of jurisdiction. 
(1971) adopts it as a general principle: s. 145, at p. 414. 
34. For an analysis of these rules seeJ.-G. Castel. Canadian Conflict of Laws, 2ndedn. (1986)ch. 
11, at p. 187. 
,. 
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The doctrine of forum non conveniens was developed in order to prevent 
Canadian courts from accepting jurisdiction, when it was more appropriate for a 
court in another province or country to hear the lawsuit because the connection 
with the court selected by the plaintiff was negligible or non existent. · 
In the area of jurisdiction, convenience, fairness and justice are the objectives 
that must be taken into consideration when applying the principle of proximity 
which finds its expression in the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The court that 
has the most real and substantial connection with the lawsuit is the forum 
conveniens since it will be able to achieve justice at much less inconvenience or 
expense to the parties than the court having jurisdiction by application of the 
established ground or factor upon which such jurisdiction is based. In other words, 
the principle of proximity is tied to the issue of suitability or appropriateness of the 
forum. 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens seeks out the natural forum which is the 
one with which the lawsuit has the most real and substantial connection. The court 
must look for connecting factors in this sense. These factors include not only 
factors affecting convenience or expense but also other factors such as the law 
governing the relevant transaction and the places where the parties, respectively. 
reside or carry on business. When they have exercised their discretion to decline 
jurisdiction on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, Canadian courts 
have relied upon cases such as Rockware Glass Ltd. v. MacShannon3s and 
Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., 36 two decisions of the House of Lords. 
In Bonaventure Systems Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, the Ontario Divisional 
Court stated:37 
'As part of the first stage, the applicant for a stay must satisfy the court that the foreign 
jurisdiction is the convenient forum. Convenient forum means that the applicant must 
establish that the foreign jurisdiction is the more appropriate natural forum to tty the 
action in the sense that the foreign jurisdiction has the most real and substantial 
connection with the lawsuit. It will be presumed that justice can best be obtained in the 
foreign jurisdiction if it is the natural forum in the sense that justice can be done between 
the parties at substantially less inconvenience or expense in the natural forum of a 
lawsuit. However, in the exceptional case, justice may not be best done in the natural 
forum where a substantial number of major witnesses reside in the other jurisdiction. 
35. [1978] A.C. 795 (~). 
36. [1987] A.C. 460 (HL). 
37. (1986) 32 DL.R. (4th) 721 (Ont DC), at pp. 729-730; Patseas v. Castelo (1988) 54 DL.R. 
(4th) 573 (BCCA); Antares Shipping Corp. v. The Ship 'Capricorn' [1977] 2 S.C.R. 422; United 
Oilseed Products Ltd v. Royal Bank [1988] 5 W.W.R. 181 (Alta. CA). For a survey see J.-G. Castel, 
CanadianConjlictoflAws,2ndedn. (1986) Ch. 13,atp.219,Supplement(1990), atp. 18 et seq. Also 
J.W. Hom, Court Jurisdiction (1989) Ch. XXI, atp. 108. 
~ · 
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The applicant for a stay of an Ontario action must thus establish that justice can clearly 
be best done in the foreign jurisdiction. That test satisfied, the applicant is still not yet 
entitled to a stay. 
The second stage of an application for a stay of an Ontario action in a case of competing 
jurisdiction raises the question as to whether the stay will deprive the respondent plaintiff 
of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage by maintaining the Ontario action which 
will not be available to him in the foreign jurisdiction. At this stage, the onus lies on the 
respondent plaintiff to establish the loss of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage. 
The court must not presume such loss.' 
Since the doctrine of forum non conveniens is now applied whether the defendant 
is served within or without the province or Canada, it is possible to argue that the 
principle of proximity has become the general rule rather than a corrective for 
determining the jurisdiction of Canadian courts in cases involving one or more 
legally relevant foreign elements. In all cases, the appropriate forum must be the 
one which has the most real and substantial connection with the lawsuit. The ( 
traditional grounds upon which Canadian courts base their jurisdiction which are 
generally defined by law, are subservient to this principle. However, if the 
particular ground invoked by the plaintiff provides the most real and substantial 
connection, the court will not declare itself forum non conveniens. 
It would seem that the doctrine of forum non conveniens which implements the 
principle of proximity is too rigid if it means the most real and substantial 
connection. In the field of conflicts of jurisdictions, unlike that of choice of law, 
it does not matter if several courts have jurisdiction provided the ground or factor 
that is used by the court constitutes a sufficient connection. 
3.4 Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
Following English precedent developed in the 19th century, it had long been 
established in common law Canada that a foreign court has 'international' 
jurisdiction to pronounce a judgment in personam capable of recognition and 
enforcement where, at the date of commencement of the proceedings, the defendant 
was resident or present within the country, state or province of that court or, if a 
corporatio~ was carrying on business there. In addition, 'international' jurisdiction 
was recognized where the defendant, in the character of the plaintiff had selected 
the court in which he or she was afterwards sued or where he or she had submitted 
or agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of that court. Other bases for the exercise of 
j'1tisdiction by a foreign court were not recognized.38 
38. For a survey see 1.-G. Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws, 2nd edn, (1986) at pp. 240-247; see, 
e.g., Emanuel et al. v. Symon (1908] 1 K.B. 302 (CA); Forbes v. Simmons (1914) 20 DL.R. 100 (Alta. 
SC); Marshallv. Houghton [1923) 2 W.W .R. 553 (Man. CA); Standal' s Patents Ltd. v.Lakeland Mills 
Ltd. (1990) 31 C.P.R. (3d) 167 (BCSC Master). 
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As already indicated, in all the common law provinces, the rules of civil 
procedure allow for service out of the province on certain grounds which go far 
beyond those that are traditionally recognized as giving international jurisdiction 
to a foreign court. However, a judgment rendered in a province.ori any of these 
grounds cannot be enforced in another province if it is not one that gives the 
original court international jurisdiction in the eyes of the enforcing court. Thus, 
until recently, in cases where jurisdiction was based on grounds not recognized by 
the courts of the State or province where the debtor resided or had assets, the best 
tactic was not to appear at all before the foreign court and then resist the 
enforcement of the foreign default judgment by arguing that the original court 
Jacked international jurisdiction. To overcome this situation, some courts resorted 
to jurisdictional reciprocity or bilaterality. 39 It was not until 1991 that Canadian 
courts moved away from traditional jurisdictional rules with respect to the 
recognition and enforcement of the judgments of sister provinces. The seminal 
decision that accomplished this revolution was given by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in De Savoye v. Morguard and Investments Ltd.40 
The facts of this case are simple. The respondents, Morguard Investments Ltd. 
and Credit Foncier Trust Company, became mortgagors of ·lands in Alberta in 
1978. The appellant, De Savoye, who then resided in Alberta and originally the 
guarantor, took title to the lands and assumed the obligations of mortgagor. 
Subsequently, he moved to British Columbia where he established his residence 
after severing all his business and other ties with Alberta. When the mortgages fell 
into arrears, the respondents brought actions in Alberta for foreclosure and served 
the appellant in British Columbia pursuant to Rule 30(g) of the Alberta Rules of 
Court. 41 
The appellant did not appear or defend the actions, nor was he under any 
contractual obligation to submit to the jurisdiction of the Alberta Court. The 
respondents obtained judgments nisi in the foreclosure actions. At the expiry of the 
redemption period, they became the owners of the mortgaged properties as a result 
of a judicial sale and judgments were entered against the appellant for the 
39. Marcotte v. Mergson (1987) 19 B.CL.R. (2d) 300, 24 C.P.C. (2d) 201 (Co. Ct. BC). The 
enforcing court should recognize and enforce a judgment from another province if the original court 
took jurisdiction in circumstances where, if the facts were transposed to the enforcing province, its 
courts would have taken jurisdiction. 
40. (1991) 76 DL.R. (4th) 256, 122 N.R. 81, (1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077. 
41. The rule provides that: 
'Service outside of Alberta of any document by which any proceeding is commenced, or of notice 
thereof, may be allowed by the Court whenever: ... 
(g) the action is iJi respect of a breach committed within or out of Alberta, and irrespective of the fact, 
if that is the case, that the breach was preceded or accompanied by a breach committed out of Alberta 
that rendered impossible the performance of so much of the contract as ought to have been performed 
within Alberta;. 
This rule is substantially similar to British Columbia Rule 13(1){g). 
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deficieneies between the amount obtained for the properties and the amount owing 
on the mortgages. Action was then taken by each of the respondents to enforce the , 
Alberta judgments for the deficiencies. Judgment was given in their favour by the j 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, a decision which was upheld by the Court of 
Appeal. On a further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada, when confirming this 
decision, rejected the test of jurisdictional reciprocity which had been applied by 
the courts below in favour of a modified principle of proximity. 
The court was of the opinion that the proper test to be applied is whether it is 
inherently reasonable for the action to be brought in a particular jurisdiction. In 
other words, where the defendant or the subject matter of the dispute had a (and not 
the most) real and substantial connection with the court that gave the judgment, it 
is reasonable that such judgment be recognized in other provinces. This is called 
'interprovincial comity' in the sense of mutual self-interest and convenience. In the 
present case, it was reasonable for the Alberta court to have taken jurisdiction 
because the properties were situated in that province and the contracts had been 
entered into there by parties then both resident in Alberta. Generally speaking, the 
principle of proximity in this milder form is more logical and practical than 
jurisdictional reciprocity for determining the ' international, jurisdiction of the 
original court. It is much wider, less rigid, does not create difficult problems of 
interpretation and constitutes a true rule of private international law in the field of 
conflicts of jurisdictions. The new test is designed to enlarge the grounds upon 
which Canadian courts recognize the jurisdiction of the courts of other provinces 
for the purpose of enforcing their judgments at common law. It is an all-embracing 
test since it includes the traditional common law grounds of 'international, 
jurisdiction. There is no danger that the sovereignty of the province of the 
enforcing court will be jeopardized by the exercise of jurisdiction by the original 
court, since the enforcing court is the sole judge as to what constitutes a real and 
substantial connection. Therefore, this test could also be applied to judgments 
rendered in foreign States.42 In some cases, the application of the test could result 
in a situation where the original court had 'international' jurisdiction in the eyes of 
the enforcing court even though that court would not possess jurisdiction in similar 
circumstances. This is one of the differences that exist between reciprocity and 
proximity. What constitutes a real and substantial connection is not always easy to 
determine. For instance, should personal property within the jurisdiction constitute 
a sufficient real and substantial connection? Should it make any difference whether 
~e property is in Canada or abroad? Eventually, the courts of each province will 
42. This was done in Clarke v. Lo Bianco (1991) 59 B.CL.R.(2d) 334 (BCSC) where the court 
went as far as to accept the existence of a real and substantial connection with California at the time 
the cause of action arose which was no longer present at the time when the action was begun in the 
California court. Also Minkler & Kirshbaum v. Sheppard (1991), 60 B .CL.R. (2d) 360 (SC); Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Vanstone (1992), 63 B.C.L.R. 190, 88 DL.R. (4th) 448 (SC); Moses v. 
Shore Boat Builders (1992), 68 B.C.L.R. (2d) 394 (SC). 
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develop their own rules as to what amounts to a real and substantial connection in 
a particular situation in order to recognize the 'international' jurisdiction of the 
original court at common law. Probably, some of the. grounds for service ex juris 
used by the enforcing court could be recognized as constituting a real and 
substantial connection for the original court. 
With respect to the issue of forum non conveniens, and the discretionary power 
of the court, it is difficult to see how the enforcing court could refuse to recognize 
the jurisdiction of the original court on the ground of forum non conveniens when 
it is based on a real and substantial connection, since it is generally admitted that 
the natural forum for the trial of an action is that with which the action has the most 
real and substantial connection. The statement by the Supreme Court of Canada 
that permitting suit where there is a substantial connection with the action provides 
a reasonable balance between the rights of the parties, opens the door to the full 
recognition of the principle of proximity as the general rule for the exercise of 
jurisdiction by Canadian courts.43 Whether this new approach should be supported 
is doubtful. In our opinion, the principle of proximity should only be resorted to as 
an exception when it is necessary to correct a bad situation, 
1 4. THE NEW CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC 
On December 18, 1991, the Quebec National Assembly adopted the Civil Code of 
Quebec which will come into force in 199444 and replace the Civil Code of Lower 
Canada enacted in 1865. Book ten of the new Code is devoted to private 
international law. Other parts of the Code deal with domicile and residence and the 
proof of foreign law and foreign documents. It is not within the scope of this paper 
to analyze the new rules of private international law. What should be mentioned, 
however, is that these rules have a chequered origin. They are based in part on a 
project prepared by the Private International Law Committee of the Office of 
Revision of the Civil Code which incorporated the provisions of some of the Hague 
Conventions45 and, in part, on the 1987 federal law of Switzerland devoted to 
private international law, as well as the 1980 EEC Convention on contractual 
obligations. It is also interesting to note that the principle of proximity is adopted 
by the Code which provides that, exceptionally, the law normally applicable will 
be set aside, if in the light of all attendant circumstances, it is clear that the 
situation is only remotely connected with that law and is much more closely 
43. (1991) 76 D.L.R. (4th) 256, at p. 277. 
44. L.Q. 1991, c. 64. . 
45. Office of Revision of the Civil Code, Report on the Quebec Civil Code (1977), Vol. I, at p. 593 
et seq. 
30 1.-G. CASTEL NILR 1993 
connected with the law of another State. This provision which acts as a corrective, 
does not apply where the law is designated in a legal instrument 46 
The principle of proximity is also used directly to determine the law applicable 
to obligations47 and the international jurisdiction of Quebec judicial and admin-
istrative authorities48 and, indirectly, to test the jurisdiction of foreign judicial and 
administrative authorities49 for the purpose of recognizing and enforcing a foreign 
decision.50 
5. CONCLUSION 
The recent evolution of some Canadian private international law rules indicates that 
the close association that has existed between Canada and the Hague Conference 
for the past twenty-four years has been mutually beneficial. By participating 
actively in the work of all its sessions, and implementing a certain number of its 
conventions, Canada has been able to align some of its private international law 
rules on those of the rest of the world. The country has finally begun to emerge 
from its splendid international legal isolation! On the other hand, Canada's long 
experience with interprovincial conflicts, its successful attempts at unification of 
the law on the domestic level through the Uniform Law Conference have enabled 
it to make a substantial and original contribution to the work of the Hague 
Conference. In the future, this successful cross-pollination can only accelerate the 
process of world-wide unification of private international law rules to the 
advantage of all. 
46. Art. 3082. This is based on Art. 15 of the Swiss law. 
47. Arts. 3112-3113. 
48. Arts 3135-3136. 
49. Art. 3164. 
50. Art. 3155(1). In general see E. Groffier, 'Lar6forme du dorit international priv6', 52 R. du B. 
(1992) p. 627; J.G. Castel, 'Commentaire sur certaines dispositions du Code civil du Qu6bec se 
rapportant au droit international priv6', 119 Clunet (1992) p. 625. 
